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Democratic Rhetoric: How Should the
State Speak?
Josiah Ober†
INTRODUCTION
I agree with most of the substantive arguments in Corey
Brettschneider’s book When the State Speaks, What Should It
Say: I think that the middle ground, between a highly activist
coercive and invasive state (the Intrusive State) and a fully
neutral state that allows hateful speech to go unanswered (the
Hateful Society), is the right “solution space” for liberal democracy.
I applaud Brettschneider’s emphasis on free and equal citizenship
as the core value that a liberal democracy must defend. Indeed, I
would go further, and say that any democracy that deserves the
name, whether liberal or not, must defend that ground.
My comments will not focus on the theoretical foundations
of the book’s argument, but on possible extensions of it. At the
core of my response is the thought that a lot more can be done
by a state (by its representatives) in the way of expressive
articulation of what Brettschneider calls “reasons for rights.”1
So I will be focusing on an issue that does come up in the book,
but does not seem to get its full due: once we have decided the
substance of what the state should say (public justifications for free
and equal citizenship, and public refutations of those who would
deny the relevant sorts of political freedom and equality to citizens)
and once we have agreed on the means (persuasion, not coercion)
by which the state will say it, how ought the state to speak?
My primary concern is that Brettschneider leaves to one
side what I see as the centrally important issue of democratic
rhetoric: once we have decided what the state should say, we
† Stanford University. Constantine Mitsotakis Professor in the School of
Humanities and Sciences, Professor of Political Science and Classics. Author of books and
articles on Greek history, classical political thought and practice, and democratic theory.
1 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT
SAY?: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 4-5, 12-
14, 20-21 (2012).
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need to ask whether, when the state speaks, anyone will be
persuaded. The answer is surely, “only if the state speaks
persuasively.” That raises the question of how and why speech
persuades—which is, of course, what rhetoric is all about. While
contemporary analytic political theory (in stark contrast to classical
political theory) tends to avoid the topic of rhetoric, perhaps
because of its association with misleading and pernicious speech,
studying democratic speech without attending to democratic
rhetoric is rather like studying an automobile without attending to
its engine—rhetoric is the engine of democratic politics; if we ignore
it we will never understand what makes the thing go.2
Brettschneider offers two main answers to the question
of how the state ought to speak. First, public officials ought to
speak out against attacks on equality (notably against racism,
sexism, and gay-bashing) and they ought to honor historical
movements that pushed in the direction of greater freedom and
equality for citizens (e.g. by national holidays and monuments
and school curricula). Second, the state ought to be more selective
about its subsidies to private organizations, including religious
organizations; organizations that reject or denigrate free and
equal citizenship ought to be denied public money and tax breaks.
It is the first of these two categories that most interests
me—and that seems to get somewhat short shrift in the book.
One of Brettschneider’s important points is that there is a
qualitative difference between the duty of citizens to speak out
in defense of democratic rights—the point was strongly made by
John Stuart Mill and brilliantly exemplified by Martin Luther
King, Jr.—and the duty of agents of the state to do so. And yet,
the book does not seem to offer a very detailed road map that
might guide us in thinking about what that special duty of
representatives of the state would mean in democratic practice.
The positive examples that Brettschneider offers of the
proper use of non-fiscal democratic persuasion by agents of the
state are overwhelmingly drawn from U.S. Supreme Court
opinions and jurisprudence. Yet, as Brettschneider rightly and
repeatedly points out, Supreme Court opinions are not generally
models of persuasive public speech. Almost no one outside of the
tribe of political theorists and constitutional lawyers reads
2 See Carnes Lord, Aristotle and the Idea of Liberal Education, in
DEMOKRATIA: A CONVERSATION ON DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 271, 283-84
(Josiah Ober & Charles Hedrick eds., 1996) (noting the central concern of classical
political theory was with rhetoric). See generally JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN
DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989)
(discussing the importance of rhetoric in classical democracy).
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them, and it seems unlikely that many citizens who do read
them alter their viewpoints on rights as a result. The other
examples I found in the book were the establishment of Martin
Luther King Day; history standards that mandate teaching about
the civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights movements; Bill
Clinton’s apology for the Tuskegee experiments; Michael
Bloomberg’s chastisement of anti-Muslim speech related to the
Cordoba Center; and Barack Obama’s lukewarm support for
Iranian democracy. I will stipulate, without much fear of
objection, that none of these belongs on any plausible list of the
top ten moments in the history of pro-democratic, rights-
justifying political speech.
I. TOP TEN PRO-DEMOCRATIC SPEECHES
What would Brettschneider say about examples of
public speech that do have a good claim to belong on a top ten
list? Although there are many candidates for inclusion on the
top ten list, here (in chronological order, and limited to Athens,
England, and the USA) are ten candidates that come to mind:
1. Solon, 594 B.C.E. Elegiac poetry justifying his legal
reforms. “[R]ules of law alike for base and noble.”3
2. Pericles, 431 B.C.E. Funeral Oration. “Its
administration favors the many instead of the few;
this is why it is called a democracy.”4
3. Demosthenes, 346 B.C.E. Speech 21 Against
Meidias. “[T]he laws are strong through you and you
through the laws.”5
4. Edmund Burke, 1774. Speech to the Electors of
Bristol. “Parliament is a deliberative Assembly of
one Nation, with one Interest.”6
3 ARISTOTLE, ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION ch. 12, § 4 (H. Rackman ed. & trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1952) (c. 594 B.C.E.) (quoting Solon), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0046%3Achapte
r%3D12%3Asection%3D4.
4 Pericles, Funeral Oration, in THUCYDIDES, PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. 2.34-
46, INTERNET ANCIENT HISTORY SOURCEBOOK (Paul Halsall ed., Aug. 2000) (c. 431
B.C.E.), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/pericles-funeralspeech.asp.
5 Demosthenes, Speech 21: Against Meidias § 224 (A. T. Murray trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1939) (c. 346 B.C.E.), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0074%3Aspeech%3D21%3Asection%3D2
24. Demosthenes was not stricto sensu speaking an agent of the state, but as
prosecutor, Demosthenes was serving a public function.
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5. Abraham Lincoln, 1863. Gettysburg Address. “[O]f
the people, by the people, and for the people.”7
6. Dwight Eisenhower, 1957. Address on the events at
Little Rock. “Mob rule cannot be allowed to override
the decisions of our courts.”8
7. John F. Kennedy, 1963. Speech in Berlin: “Ich bin
ein Berliner.”9
8. Lyndon Johnson, 1965. Address to a joint session of
Congress on voting legislation. “[We] shall overcome.”10
9. Ronald Reagan, 1987. Speech at Brandenburg Gate:
“[T]ear down this wall!”11
10. Barack Obama, 2013. Speech on race in America:
“Trayvon Martin could have been me.”12
These speeches are not all focused specifically on free
and equal citizenship per se, but each seems to me, one way or
another, to invoke rights, and reasons for rights (or in the
Greek examples, quasi-rights), and democracy. So my question
for Brettschneider is this: which speeches pass the test of
appropriate democratic persuasion, which fail the test, and why?
Brettschneider’s core claim for democratic persuasion is
that it must articulate the reasons for rights. I believe the
speeches I have listed do that, one way or another, but they use
very different kinds of rhetoric than analytic political theorists
are used to employing in professional scholarship. In brief, we
write in a deliberately-measured, not to say arid, prose that is
largely stripped of appeal to sensibilities other than reason
6 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), transcript
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c1.html.
7 Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), transcript
available at http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm.
8 Dwight Eisenhower, Address on Little Rock, Arkansas (Sept. 24, 1957),
transcript available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6335/.
9 John F. Kennedy, Speech in Berlin (June 26, 1963), transcript available at
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3376.
10 Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: The American Promise
(Mar. 15, 1965), transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/
archives.hom/speeches.hom/650315.asp.
11 Ronald Reagan, Speech at the Brandenburg Gate (June 12, 1987),
transcript available at http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/reagan-tear-down.htm.
12 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin (July 19,
2013), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/
remarks-president-trayvon-martin.
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itself. The rhetoric of the speeches listed above is, I believe,
grounded in appeals to reason, but in each case it goes well
beyond the bare appeal to reason, appealing to an array of
positive, non-hateful emotions and to an array of civic virtues.
They use techniques of narrative, invention, style, and delivery
that are familiar from classical rhetoric (as canonized by, for
example, the Latin writers Cicero and Quintilian). Brettschneider
alludes briefly to legitimate uses of emotional appeals, noting that
“the requirement that democratic persuasion include explicit
reasons does not mean that it must avoid emotion or rhetorical
persuasiveness.”13 But that tip of a hat to rhetoric is bracketed by
much more extensive discussion of worries about manipulation,
subliminal messages, propaganda, and so on. It appears that
Brettschneider is nervous about letting the rhetorical camel’s
nose into the tent of public reason—a nervousness that he shares,
I dare say, with many members of the political theory tribe.
There is reason enough for that nervousness—after all,
rhetoric can be and sometimes is divorced from reason-giving in
ways that can devolve into overt manipulation and propaganda.
The fear of bad rhetoric begins with the founding works of
western political theory—most notably of course with Plato
(especially in his dialogues Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Republic), who
drew a bright line between philosophy as the realm of truth and
reason, and rhetoric as the realm of opinion and deception.
II. A NEW THEORY OF RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC RHETORIC
Once we have set our foot on the road, as Brettschneider
urges us, of using persuasion rather than coercion to achieve
important public ends—to resist devolution into the Hateful
Society without bringing in the heavy artillery of the Intrusive
State—we need to take a fuller inventory of the tools in the
toolbox of persuasion. No doubt denying subsidies is one powerful
tool. Expressing reasons for rights in the austere technical
languages of analytic liberal political philosophy and Supreme
Court jurisprudence may also be tools of sorts. But surely we
cannot afford to overlook the potential tools of rhetorical
persuasion. Nor, if we are to take up the theoretical challenge of
democratic persuasion, can we afford to simply leave rhetoric to
disciplines other than political theory or to political practitioners.
There is nothing intrinsically odd about saying that
political theory should take rhetoric seriously, given that
13 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 88-89.
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rhetoric was once a major part of political theory. Plato not
only criticized the misuse of rhetoric, he understood it deeply
and his dialogues are masterpieces of persuasive rhetoric—how
many of us got started in political theory in part because we
fell in love with the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, and
Republic? Aristotle’s great trilogy on political theory concludes
with the Art of Rhetoric. And of course Cicero was a political
philosopher, theorist, and practitioner of political rhetoric; ditto
Machiavelli and Hobbes.
Classical rhetorical theory is, however, inadequate to
the task of fully explaining the sorts of democratic persuasion
Brettschneider envisions. We need a new theory of responsible
public rhetoric that is (1) suited to the sort of democratic
persuasion that Brettschneider advocates, (2) capable of
accommodating the emotional force of great public speeches
that have actually had a meaningful impact on citizens in
terms of transforming attitudes, and (3) delivered in a way that
motivates citizens to change their behavior so as to more
reliably act in defense of free and equal citizenship. If we do not
develop the analytic tools to understand how and why and
when rhetoric moves people, we will never really understand
the toolbox of democratic persuasion—much less make it
available for use in the real world in which the state speaks to
citizens. A new theory of public rhetoric requires expanding the
domain of contemporary analytic political theory. Surely, that
is exactly what Brettschneider is urging us to do as we mark
out the terrain between the Hateful Society and the Intrusive
State and seek to learn how that terrain can best be defended.
What does Brettschneider think about the proposition
that accepting the core argument of his book demands a
substantial expansion of the field of analytic liberal theory in
the direction of a new theory of rhetoric? That expansion does
not require that we reframe Brettschneider’s arguments in
terms of emotions or virtues,14 but it does require that we
develop a robust theoretical framework capable of determining
when appeals to emotions and virtues are, and are not,
compatible with offering citizens reasons for rights.
III. POSSIBLE POLICY CHANGES
Brettschneider’s chapters on the use of selective subsidy
could readily be employed to draft the legislation necessary to
14 Id. at 20 (rejecting arguments based on virtues).
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implement the policy changes demanded by his normative
arguments. By contrast, there seems to be no very obvious
legislative agenda implied by his discussion of the use of public
speech by representatives of the government for democratic
persuasion—other than perhaps tweaking standards for
teaching American history. By way of conclusion, let me offer a
few sample policy changes and pose the question of whether
(assuming, counterfactually, that they could be passed)
Brettschneider would regard these as promoting or violating
his conception of legitimate democratic persuasion.
1. Require the president (and state governors) to give a
“State of the Citizenship” address each year (or, if we
wanted to mimic the Athenians, every year in which
citizen-soldiers died in combat). The purpose of the
speech would be to give reasons for rights in light of
challenges to and advances in rights at home and
abroad in the last year.
2. Require that each U.S. Supreme Court justice issue
a public justification (or concur in another justice’s
justification), expressed briefly and in non-technical
language, for each of his or her votes on cases affecting
free and equal citizenship. This would be separate
from lengthy and often technical legal opinions.
3. Require that elected officials (or maybe all government
officials) (1) take a public oath of personal commitment
to, and belief in, the fundamental rights of free and
equal citizenship (i.e. they not only swear to uphold the
laws guaranteeing rights, but affirm their belief in
those rights) and (2) make a public statement of their
own reasons for their commitment to those rights
(which could appeal variously to political or
comprehensive conceptions). Those whose public
behavior or votes blatantly violated their oath would
be appropriately sanctioned (by, for example, public
exposure, fines, and loss of office).
4. Require an oath similar to number three above as part
of the naturalization process for new U.S. citizens.
5. Seek to ensure (through mandating coverage on all
TV stations, emailing every citizen, or similar means)
that important expressions of reasons for rights (e.g.
numbers one and two above) are privileged, and thus
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have a better chance to cut through the chaotic and
noisy barrage of information/entertainment to which
all contemporary citizens are constantly exposed.
My guess is that Brettschneider would not want to
endorse all (or maybe not any) of these policy changes, but if I am
right in that, I would like to hear why not. In my view, each of the
sample changes seems, on the face of it, to be in line with the
core claims of the book (as, for example, demanding
commitment oaths of all citizens would not be). In any event, I
think that sketching a range of policy changes, and then
determining which ones fit and fail to fit Brettschneider’s theory
of democratic persuasion—along with the test case of the “top ten
list” above—would help to put some flesh on the skeleton of a
theory presented in Brettschneider’s stimulating book.
